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Abstract
Can practical factors influence a subject’s position to know? Traditionally this ques-
tion has been answered in the negative. A subject’s position to know proposition p is not
thought to improve merely because the subject wants to know p or has certain practical
stakes depend on whether p. Appealing to these wants and practical interests while de-
fending a claim to know is thought to be epistemically inappropriate. We argue, to the
contrary, that practical factors can influence (i.e. encroach upon) a subject’s position to
know and can do so in an epistemically appropriate way. The argument we provide is rela-
tively straightforward. We claim that knowledge of a certain set of propositions requires a
prior action taken on behalf of the subject. This prior action can be influenced by practical
factors and thus practical factors can influence a subject’s position to know. Furthermore,
we argue that such a move can be epistemically appropriate if it arises in an instance when
the evidence and arguments favoring belief — at least from the subject’s own point of view
— are inconclusive. We conclude with an argument that the provided account offers a new
framework to defend moral encroachment. The prior action taken on behalf of a subject,
when it is both practically influenced and is epistemically appropriate, can be interpreted
as a moral action.
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A subject’s evidence for a proposition p does not get stronger merely by believing that p,
or wanting p to be true, or by having certain practical stakes depend on whether p. These
factors may influence the evidence we seek in the future for p, or how we interpret the
evidence we currently have for p, but they do nothing to improve one’s evidential position
with respect to p.
A similar situation is thought to occur with knowledge. A subject’s epistemic position
with respect to p does not improve merely because the subject wants to know that p or has
a practical investment in p. This view is currently the predominant view in epistemology
and is referred to as intellectualism.1 A natural extension of intellectualism that compares
the relative epistemic position of two subjects produces the following:
Intellectualism: Two subjects S and S’ in the same epistemic position with respect to
p are just alike in their position to know that p.
An epistemic position is dependent on the strength of one’s evidence, the reliability of
the evidence, being aware of counter-possibilities, etc. These factors are claimed to be
appropriately truth-related. Other factors, such as those mentioned above that include
having a practical investment in whether p, are considered to be non-truth related.
1Intellectualism is also called ‘purism’, as in [9].
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The factors that determine a subject’s epistemic position make up a subject’s position
to know that p and may not be sufficient for the subject to actually know that p. It may
be the case, for example, that one’s epistemic position (i.e. the evidence one has for p) is
insufficient for knowledge that p. In this case two subjects in the same epistemic position
may be alike in their position to know, but this position is such that they cannot know p.
One needs to be in a sufficiently strong epistemic position to know that p.
There are two additional factors that play a role in knowing that p that are not directly
covered by one’s epistemic position. To know that p it must be the case that p is true.
Again if this condition is not met, two subjects in the same epistemic position may be alike
in their position position to know, but this position will be such that they cannot know.
As another example, though two subjects may again be alike in their epistemic position
with respect to p, it may be the case that one subject finds the evidence sufficient for belief
while the other withholds judgment. To know that p one must also believe that p and this
belief comes in addition to one’s epistemic position. Taking these into account, to know p
a subject needs to have a true belief and be in a sufficiently strong epistemic position.
Supposing a true belief from the start we can reproduce one of the traditional definitions
of intellectualism: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends exclusively on
truth-related factors.2 In this way, the focus is often on justification since it is (broadly)
the component that is needed for a true belief to count as knowledge. The thought is that
while non-truth related factors may play a role in belief formation, they play no additional
role in whether a subject’s true belief counts as knowledge (i.e. they play no additional
role in improving one’s epistemic position).
Lately it has been argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge may depend
on certain non-truth related factors (see, for example, [7, 10, 12]. Preferring to stick with
the broader, doxastically-neutral definition of intellectualism provided above, this position
claims that two subjects in the same epistemic position may not be alike in their position
to know. In particular practicalism claims:
Practicalism: Two subjects S and S’, equally alike with respect to their epistemic posi-
tion but who differ with respect to their practical position, may differ with respect
2As in (as in Stanley [20] and Fantl and McGrath [8])
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to their position to know that p.
The question, in short, is whether practical factors can influence a subject’s position know.
I will use the term practicalism throughout, but will also refer (as is popular in the litera-
ture) to pragmatic factors encroaching (i.e. pragmatic encroachment) on knowledge.3
The first two chapters look at how pragmatic factors can appropriately influence a
subject’s epistemic position. If pragmatic factors are non-truth related how can they be
claimed to improve a subject’s position to know? Why is it not just an act of wishful
thinking, or, in the case when a subject comes to acquire a true belief, of epistemic luck?
The rest of Chapter 1 will focus on recent accounts given by proponents of practicalism that
try to offer positive responses to these questions. Chapter 2 discusses several arguments
against practicalism that answer these questions in the negative.
With these discussions in mind Chapter 3 provides a new argument for practicalism
that, we argue, overcomes these questions. Chapter 3 is comprised of two parts. The
first part provides the argument for practicalism, the second part argues that the provided
account of encroachment is best characterized as moral encroachment. Our argument for
practicalism is relatively straightforward. In order to know some propositions a subject
must hold an appropriate prior belief. This belief can be appropriately pragmatically
influenced, and thus pragmatic factors can improve a subject’s position to know. What
characterizes these particular beliefs amongst other types of beliefs? The answer to this
question, we will argue, is that these types of belief are particularly moral beliefs. Our
argument for practicalism therefore also provides a new argument for moral encroachment.
Appropriate pragmatic encroachment, as we have described it, just is a kind of moral
encroachment.
3The term practicalism is given by Grimm [12]. As Grimm points out, the associated term pragmatism
has too many alternative connotations.
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1.1 An Example — Low/High Stakes
We will begin with an example for practicalism originally given by DeRose [4].4 The Bank
Case is as follows:
(Low Stakes) My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan
to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we
drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often
are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks
as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be
deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our
paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open
tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it’ll be
open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.”
(High Stakes) My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as
in [Low Stakes ], and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit
our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on
Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until
noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and important check.
If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday
morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad
situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds
me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know
the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as confident as I was before that
the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I’d better go in and make
sure.”
Given the intuitive legitimacy of the husband’s response in both Low and High, it
seems that the husband speaks truthfully in both instances.5 If we take this to be the case,
4Originally this example was put forth as an argument for contextualism. Much of the encroachment
literature grew out of debates over contextualism and appeals back to many of the same examples. We
will discuss contextualism, which is DeRose’s own view, in Chapter 2.
5Chapter 2 will consider several objections to this claim.
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and if the husband’s eptistemic position has not changed from Low to High, then some
non-epistemic factor influenced the husband’s position with respect to knowing whether
or not the bank will be open or closed on Saturday. These non-epistemic factors are
reflected in the differences between Low and High and may include the varying importance
of the check or the varying salience of counter-possibilities. The Bank Case therefore
poses a possible counter-example to intellectualism. In the coming sections we will look
at additional examples and more complicated arguments for practicalism. This thesis
will focus on providing a defense of practicalism. In particular, we will argue that these
examples point toward an additional, practical condition on knowledge.
1.2 Another Example — Knowledge and Action
Fantl and McGrath offer two additional insights for arguing towards practicalism [8, 10].
The first highlights the connection between intellectualism and certainty. Intellectualism
seems to have a difficult time explaining how a subject can know while being in a position
less than certainty. Taking this problem as the starting point, Fantl and McGrath offer
an alternative argument for encroachment that claims that a subject’s practical situation
influences the standards of justification necessary to know. They argue for this claim by
focusing on the connection between knowledge and action. Unlike other approaches (such
as the Bank Case) that rest on the interpretation of a scenario, in providing an underly-
ing knowledge-to-action link Fantl and McGrath provide a more substantial, theoretical
account of pragmatic encroachment.
Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic justification is relatively short. It relies
on the following two premises:
i. fallibilism: a subject can know that p while being in an epistemic position that provides
less than maximal justification for p,6 and
ii. KA: if a subject knows that p, then the subject is rational to act as if p.
6As taken from [8]. Similarly, fallibilism may claim that a subject can know p even though there is, for
the subject, a non-zero epistemic chance that not-p [9, p. 84].
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A subject can fallibly know that his car is parked outside (because he parked it there a
short while ago) even though his epistemic position could be improved (i.e. his justification
would increase) by looking out the window of his house and making sure. A change in a
subject’s practical situation may no longer make it rational for the subject to act as if p.
Given KA, a difference in what action a subject is rational to perform produces a change
in the conditions for knowledge, and in this case, a change in the conditions needed for
appropriate justification.
Here is their argument:
Suppose fallibilism and KA are true. Then there is a possible subject S who
fallibly knows that p and so is rational to act as if p. Now, so long as a subject’s
epistemic position regarding p is non-maximal with respect to justification, her
stakes in whether p can make a difference to whether she is rational to act
as if p, independently of her strength of epistemic position regarding p and of
the other traditional conditions on knowledge (e.g. belief, truth, proper basing,
etc.). For example, if I find out that the police are (for the first time ever) about
to ticket illegally parked cars on my quiet, rural street, my stakes in whether
my car is legally parked rise. This makes a difference to whether I’m rational
to act as if my car is legally parked, even if my strength of epistemic position
doesn’t change (I still remember — or seem to — legally parking it), my belief
doesn’t change (I’m just a confident guy), etc. Therefore, there is a possible
subject S’ just like S with respect to strength of epistemic position regarding
p and the other traditional conditions on knowledge, but who, because of her
different stakes, is not rational to act as if p. By KA, S’ doesnt know that p.
Therefore, because S’ satisfies all the other traditional conditions on knowledge
(S’believes that p, p is true, etc.), S’ must not be in a position to know that
p. But S is. It follows that [intellectualism] is false. [8, p. 560]
Imagine applying this idea to the Bank Case. One subject in Low and another subject
in High are in the same epistemic position. The subject in Low is rational to act as if the
bank is open on Saturday, while the subject in High is not rational to act as if the bank is
open on Saturday. The difference in the action considered rational to perform in each case
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by the two subjects signals a difference in what each subject knows. Since a subject is no
longer in a position to pragmatically act is if p, the subject is no longer justified to believe
p.
Fallibilism is a commonly held view in the literature and appeals to the idea that
knowledge requires something less than certainty. The majority of Fantl and McGrath’s
argument rests upon the knowledge-to-action link given by KA. Fantl and McGrath argue
for KA by appealing to the common use of knowledge-citations in providing good reasons
for defending and criticizing actions. In defending his action to drive past the bank in Low
the husband may say, “I know that the bank is open Saturday morning.” Similarly, (again
in Low) the wife may criticize her husband’s action if he decides to pull over and check to
see if the bank is open. In this case the wife may say to her husband, “Why are you pulling
over to check the bank’s hours when you know that the bank will be open tomorrow?” The
husband’s defense and the wife’s potential criticism only carry weight if we suppose a link
between knowledge and action.
This points towards one of the possible benefits of Fantl and McGrath’s account over
the argument sketched above about the Bank Case. What happens if the wife appeals
to the irrationality of the husband’s actions in High when he has gone into the bank to
make sure? The wife may say to her husband, “Why are you making sure the bank will
be open? You said yourself that you were there two weeks ago and that it was open until
noon.” This spells trouble for the Bank-Case-practicalist because they rely on the intuition
that it is both natural and rational for the husband to want to make sure that the bank
is open in High. The Bank-Case-practicalist therefore must address and argue against the
wife’s charge of irrationality. This possible scenario, however, does little to affect Fantl
and McGrath’s position, for even in this case the wife’s claim continues to support the
knowledge-to-action link. So far as there is a rational action for which the standards of
justification differs depending on the subject’s practical stakes, there is still pragmatic
encroachment.
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1.3 William James and ‘The Will to Believe’
Arguments for pragmatic encroachment have been put forth before its modern reemergence
in cases like the Bank Case. Most of the relevant pre-pragmatic encroachment literature
concerns evidence and appropriate belief: What amount of evidence is sufficient to hold
a justified belief? Can we ever be justified to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? In
1896 William James gave a lecture titled “The Will to Believe” that addresses these issues
and argues for a pragmatic condition on belief. James himself describes the lecture as “a
defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude . . . in spite of the fact that our merely
logical intellect may not have been coerced” [13, p. 1]. This indeed sounds like an argument
against intellectualism. Like Fantl and McGrath, James offers a theoretical account of how
pragmatic factors influence knowledge, and focuses specifically on the connection between
knowledge, action, and skepticism. The practicalism that James defends also focuses on
the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and religious beliefs. We will ultimately
continue and extend this discussion in Chapter 3, where we argue that these similarities
point towards interpreting pragmatic encroachment as a specifically moral encroachment.
The intellectualism that we have so far discussed has assumed that knowledge arises
from belief by way of truth-related factors alone. James argues, to the contrary, that
knowledge of some propositions do not follow this course. There exists a set of true
beliefs that the subject must believe in prior to acquiring the justification that will lead
to knowledge. This belief can be pragmatically influenced and in this way a subject is
pragmatically justified in forming a belief even though the appropriate truth-related factors
remain, at least at that point, agnostic. James’ argument for this claim has two parts.
First, he argues that there are a set of propositions where evidence alone cannot justify
belief or disbelief from the perspective of the subject. Then he argues that within this
set of propositions, justifying evidence cannot be found without first a willful, pragmatic
influenced, advance of belief. Putting this another way, for a specific set of truths a
pragmatic action must be made on behalf of the subject before knowledge can be acquired.
Our discussion of James will be separated into these two parts.
James begins by sectioning off a specific set of propositions that he calls live hypotheses.
A subject finds a live hypothesis to be a real candidate for belief. A living hypothesis is
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appealing and a subject lacks compelling evidence that disconfirms it [14]. By contrast,
a dead hypothesis fails to spark any credibility from the subject’s perspective. Given an
option between two living hypotheses, James focuses on those that are forced and momen-
tous. When facing many options we have the choice of remaining indifferent or not passing
judgment. A forced option cannot be avoided and allows for no such possibility. Many
options are also trivial, reversible, or fail to have significant consequences. A momentous
option carries weight for the subject and has serious consequences and/or cannot be un-
done. Options between hypotheses that are living, forced, and momentous, James calls
genuine options. It is important to emphasis that it is the subject that determines and
finds an option to be genuine. Whether or not an example possesses these characteristics
will vary from subject to subject. An option that is living for one subject may be dead to
another. The reader must keep this in mind when viewing specific examples.
Some genuine options can be resolved by further investigation or analysis. In this
way James acknowledges the importance of evidence. Ignoring evidence, failing to seek
evidence, and the like, are all objectionable to James. But James argues that there are
cases of genuine options that cannot be determined by evidence alone — they are, as
described by Jeff Jordan, intellectually open [14].7 An option being intellectually open is
closely tied to James’ views on skepticism. We will not argue for skepticism and James’
view of it here, but we will point out several passages where James expresses his views
on the matter. James gives much credit to the pervasiveness and legitimacy of skeptical
possibilities: “We want to have a truth; we want to believe that our experiments and
studies and discussions must put us on a continually better and better position towards
it; and on this line we agree to fight out our thinking lives. But if a pyrrhonistic sceptic
asks us how we know all this, can our logic find a reply? No! certainly it cannot.” [13,
p. 4]. “The trouble may all the time be essential,” James continues, “[the] intellect, even
with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be
truth or no” [13, p. 8]. Let us at least agree with James on the following point: there are
7It may be the case that this is repetitive. Since genuine options are living options, the subject already
finds both options credible and lacks the evidence necessary to confirm support for one option over the
other. Nevertheless, we find this step in the argument to be significant enough to warrant additional
discussion.
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some propositions where the evidence and arguments in favor of belief, from a subject’s
point of view, are inconclusive. How prevalent these situations are will depend on how
often evidence is found to be inconclusive. If we agree with James on the prevalence of
skeptical possibilities this may be quite frequent. Even if we disagree on this point there
will nevertheless be some instances when evidence is inconclusive. We will discuss the
relation between the prevalence of skeptical possibilities and the prevalence in pragmatic
encroachment again in Section 3.5. Following Pace [18], we will call situations involving
genuine options that are intellectually open, J-cases.
When confronted with a J-case the subject’s evidence is not significant enough to point
in either direction; there are always, that is, possibilities for the subject to justify either
alternative. James in particular focuses on two epistemic laws that affect our attitude
of belief toward a proposition in J-cases. Given an option we may either believe the
proposition in the hope of seeking the truth, or abstain from believing the proposition in
the hope of avoiding error. Pace uses the following terms to describe these attitudes [18]:
Counsel of Courage: Believe p, so that you have a chance at believing a truth.
Counsel of Caution: Don’t believe p, so that you avoid believing a falsehood.
When evidence is inconclusive neither of these attitudes is favored over the other. In these
cases the deciding factor depends on the relative importance the subject gives to belief out
of courage or caution. According to James no purely epistemic reasons in these cases can
justify support for one counsel over another: “When we stick to it that there is truth . . . ,
we do so with our whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. The sceptic
with his whole nature adopts the doubting attitude; but which of us is wiser, Omniscience
only knows” [13, p. 11].
Since evidence points in both directions, the choice to prefer one counsel over another
is in part based on one’s passional nature. The counsel a subject adopts is dependent on
individual factors that include whether the subject desires p to be true or false, or whether
the subject recognizes that belief will further his or her own practical interests [18, p. 9].
These are pragmatic factors and so the counsel we adopt in J-cases can be pragmatically
influenced. To ease future discussion we will call a willful advance made on behalf of a
subject’s passional nature in a J-case a J-belief.
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It is important to note the significance of intellectual openness to our discussion of
pragmatic encroachment.8 Intellectual openness defines a subset of hypotheses that prag-
matic factors can influence while remaining evidentially appropriate. Since the evidence
in a J-case is inconclusive, pragmatic factors cannot conflict with the subject’s evidence.
In J-cases pragmatic factors can therefore appropriately influence the attitude (i.e. coun-
sel) we take towards a proposition.9 James goes on to argue that J-beliefs can play an
important, non-trivial role in a subject’s position to know. The next few paragraphs look
at James’ argument for this additional claim.
James argues for a set of propositions that require a prior action on behalf or our
passional nature before evidence is found to be coercive. James argues for this by way of
two analogies: one about personal relationships, the other about scientific practice. Let us
look at what James says about personal relationships:
(Friend Example) Turn now [. . . ] to a certain class of questions of fact, ques-
tions concerning personal relations, states of mind between one man and an-
other. Do you like me or not? — for example: Whether you do or not depends,
in countless instances, on whether or not I meet you halfway, am willing to as-
sume that you must like me, and show you trust and expectation. The previous
faith on my part in your liking’s existence is in such cases what makes your
liking come. But if I stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have
objective evidence, until you should have done something apt, as the absolutist
say, ad extorquendum assensum meum10, ten to one your liking never comes.
[. . . ] The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about the special truth’s
existence; and so it is in innumerable cases of other sorts. Who gains promo-
tions, boons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are seen to play the
part of live hypotheses, who discounts them, sacrifices other things for their
sake before they have come, and takes risk for them in advance? His faith acts
8The connection between pragmatic encroachment and intellectually openness also serves as a major
motivation to interpret pragmatic encroachment as moral encroachment. We will discuss this connection
in Section 3.5.
9We will see this connection to intellectual honesty brought up again by Pace in Section 1.5.
10For compelling my argument
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on the powers above him as a claim, and creates its own verification. [13, p.
11]
As the Friend Example demonstrates, it may first take an action on behalf of the subject
to bring about certain truths. Furthermore, there are certain cases when a desire to bring
about an outcome is required before the outcome is achieved. A curmudgeon can be used
to demonstrate this point. It seems a person’s actions can always be interpreted in a
friendly or hostile manner and as being the result of good intentions or bad intentions.
The curmudgeon — perhaps through no lack of reason — may only find evidence that
favors his or her beliefs. If the curmudgeon does not desire to change his or her mind, no
evidence will bring about a change in their pessimistic worldview. As James aptly describes
morality: “The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by our
will. [. . . ] If your heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly
never make you believe in one” [13, p. 11]. In these cases it seems clear that one must
possess the desire first and that evidence and justification can only follow.
As James notes, relating justification of beliefs to an analogy about personal relation-
ships may seem like a stretch. James continues, however, with a more concrete account of
the workings of the scientist. Here, again, is James on the matter:
(Research Example) For purposes of discovery such indifference is to be less
highly recommended and science would be far less advanced than she is if the
passionate desires of individuals to get their own faiths confirmed had been kept
out of the game. . . . The most useful investigator, because the most sensitive
observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced
by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived. Science has organized
this nervousness into a regular technique, her so called method of verification;
and she has fallen so deeply in love with the method that one may even say that
she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. It is only truth as technically
verified that interests her. The truth of truths might come in merely affirmative
form, and she would decline to touch it. . . . however indifferent to all but the
bare rules of the game the umpire, the abstract intellect, may be, the concrete
players who furnish him the materials to judge of are usually, each one of them,
in love with some pet ‘live hypothesis’ of his own. [13, p. 10]
12
An eagerness and desire to resolve one’s pet hypothesis is helpful to discover new scientific
truths. Let us imagine a scientist facing an option between two hypotheses that are cur-
rently equally well supported by evidence (at least from the scientist’s perspective). The
scientist faces an intellectually open option similar to that of the curmudgeon in the above
example.11 As evidence for the curmudgeon supports neither friendly nor hostile behavior,
it takes an action on behalf of the curmudgeon’s passional nature before further evidence
is found to be coercive in differentiating the two options. Facing a similar intellectually
open option between two hypotheses, an action on behalf of the scientist’s passional na-
ture may be required for the scientist to ultimately find more confirming evidence. As the
Friend and Research example demonstrate, pragmatic influences from our passional na-
ture are required to find coercive evidence and to know. Knowledge of certain propositions
therefore require a pragmatic influence: a preliminary action is a necessary condition for
obtaining evidence for their truth. We will call these proposition, again following Jordan
[14], dependent propositions.
Dependent propositions are closely related to J-cases. Without the J-belief needed to
find coercive evidence, a subject facing a dependent proposition will find the decision to
believe to be intellectual open. According to James, a subject in a J-case is justified to
believe (i.e. to hold a J-belief) in the hope that the proposition may be a dependent
proposition.
James singles out questions of religious faith — what he calls the religious hypothesis
— as a subset of J-cases and in this way links pragmatic factors with moral problems. We
will look at this example to highlight how religious faith can be seen as a genuine option.
Though there are many individuals that do not take the question of religious faith to be a
living option, there are many that do. Among those that do, belief in God and/or religious
truths seem (at least to an extent) to be credible options. Many of these individuals also
find the religious hypothesis to be momentous and forced. The option is momentous in that
accepting the religious hypothesis is supposed to bring benefits to believers. The option
11It is important to note that James has previously stated that many scientific options are not momentous
options and are therefore not genuine options. Even though a scientist might find a scientific hypothesis
live enough to devote time and research, there is often very little riding on the results. Whether or not
this is the case is a different issue, but the analogy still holds as an example of specific truths that rely on
a belief prior to finding coercive supporting evidence.
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is forced in that an individual either believes in the religious hypothesis or does not. An
individual cannot, that is, escape the issue by refusing to act. In addition to being a genuine
option, the religious hypothesis is also intellectually open. As in the Friend Example these
cases are not readily settled by appealing to evidence. As no single event or piece of
evidence will provide conclusive evidence that will change the view of the curmudgeon, no
evidence will necessarily change or influence the mind of the religious skeptic. Given that
the religious hypothesis is a J-case, James argues that it may be a dependent proposition
and will require a willful advance before evidence is found to be coercive. In the end, James
acknowledges that coercive evidence may not be found to support the religious hypothesis.
James argues that he would rather provide a willful advance (and believe) in the hope of
finding evidence and at the risk of being in error than close himself off from the possibility
of finding the truth.
James provides an alternative account of encroachment where pragmatic factors only
influence a subset of the beliefs that may lead to knowledge. He argues that these dependent
propositions can only be justified through an action on the side of our passional nature and
points out that these beliefs are particularly prevalent amongst religious/moral hypotheses.
In the next section, we will discuss a recent claim by Stephen Grimm that pragmatic factors
influence the requirements for knowledge. We will finally conclude with looking at one of
the most recent works of moral-pragmatic encroachment, which lies at the intersection of
James’ and Grimm’s views.
1.4 Grimm
Grimm points out that there can be two different ways that knowledge can depend on
pragmatic factors: one supposes an additional pragmatic requirement for knowledge, the
other supposes that pragmatic factors influence the acceptable levels of the traditional
requirements for knowledge. Grimm argues that the problems expressed throughout the
literature often arise from failing to take into account the difference between these ap-
proaches. Grimm finally argues in support of pragmatic factors playing a role in setting
the appropriate threshold of the traditional factors that count as knowledge.
Let us return to the Bank Case. In High the increased stakes make so that the husband’s
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belief no longer amounts to knowledge. How would we describe this situation in High?
Natural responses would be that his evidence was not good enough, or that his evidence
was not reliable enough, or something of this sort. But these responses all point back to
traditional truth-related factors. Grimm argues, as this seems to point out, that though
pragmatic factors may play a role in the conditions for knowledge this role is only by way
of influencing traditional truth-related factors.
Grimm describes the differences between these accounts using an analogy to the re-
quirements needed to accomplish a goal. Here is Grimm’s example about running a race:
(Race Analogy) So suppose, then, that Miller and Smith are amateur runners,
gearing up for their town’s annual Race Day. They both train together for
several weeks, their muscles and joints are equally limber, and their cardiovas-
cular conditioning is more or less identical. Focusing especially on their level
of cardiovascular conditioning, we might therefore say that they are equally fit.
Thus, as Miller goes with respect to fitness, so goes Smith.
On Race Day, however, whereas Miller enters the 5k race, Smith tries for
the 15k. And while Miller finishes his race easily, unfortunately at about the
11k mark of his race, Smith begins to break down. Smith’s breathing becomes
labored, his joints throb; in short, he runs out of gas. While Smith is as fit as
Miller, and while we might even say that he simply is fit, he is not fit enough
to finish the 15k. [12, p. 7]
As this example is designed to show, accomplishing a goal (in this case, finishing the race)
depends on two factors. The first focuses on things like fitness, durability, and those factors
that are required to participate in the race. These are goal realization factors. There are
also goal threshold factors. In the Race Analogy these factors have to do with the distance
of the race. In these cases the threshold factors determine how much of the realization
factor is needed to accomplish the goal. Much like the relationship between pragmatic
factors and traditional truth-related factors, when changes along the threshold dimension
make a difference it is always in relation to the realization factors.
Grimm argues that knowledge too can be seen as accomplishing a goal. This goal
depends on certain realization factors, which are those that are traditionally associated
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with knowledge such as belief, evidence, reliability, etc. But knowledge also seems to
possess a threshold component as well. For example, for a certain true belief to count as
knowledge we often think that evidence needs to be sufficient or good enough. “Thus,” as
Grimm states, “just as a change in the distance of the race impacts how fit one needs to
be to finish the race, so too, it seems, a change in the thresholds relevant to knowledge will
affect how good one’s evidence needs to be, of how reliable one needs to be, if one’s belief
is to amount to knowledge” [12, p.12].
Such an account gives rise to two different ways to view intellectualism [12, p. 13]:
Realizer Intellectualism: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends, in a
goal-realization sense, exclusively on truth-related factors.
Threshold Intellectualism: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends, in a
goal-threshold sense, exclusively on truth-related factors; alternatively, the various
thresholds relevant to knowledge are determined exclusively by our purely epistemic
(rather than our practical) goals and concerns.
Similarly, it may be argued that practical factors are either necessary to realize knowledge
(thus challenging realizer intellectualism) or that they play a role in determining what
level of evidence is sufficient or good enough for a belief to count as knowledge (thus
challenging threshold intellectualism). Realizer intellectualism is traditionally accepted in
epistemology and Grimm does not challenge this view. In fact, Grimm argues that cases
like the Bank Case say little about realizer components of knowledge since these cases only
point to changes within the traditional truth-connected factors.12
Grimm offers several reasons, however, why threshold intellectualism faces serious prob-
lems. It seems, for instance, that many of the beliefs we form are of practical interest.
Claiming, then, that these factors play a role in knowledge seems to be the natural, more
expansive theory. The burden then lies on the threshold intellectualist to explain the
stronger claim that only a small set of truth-related factors influences the conditions for
knowledge. Grimm’s main argument is that the intellectualist seems unjustified (using only
12We will see in Chapter 2 that several of the arguments against pragmatic encroachment make this
same point.
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truth-related factors) in choosing the appropriate threshold. From a purely truth-related
point of view, why settle for anything less than perfect reliability? Similarly, why settle for
one level of reliability over another? Where these are difficult questions for the threshold
intellectualist to answer, it is precisely here that practical factors seem so natural. The
practicalist can argue that the threshold is determined by our context and situation: the
cost of being wrong, for example, or that for all practical purposes it is sufficient enough to
act upon them. What cases like the Bank Case demonstrate is that the thresholds relevant
to knowledge are partly determined by our practical goals and concerns.
1.5 Pace and Moral Encroachment
We have finally arrived at a recent account of moral encroachment given by Michael Pace.
Pace argues against what he calls wishful thinking, which are attempts at justification that
arise from the subject’s own wants and desires but that do not come from strong evidence.
Wishful thinking, he claims, has nothing to do with the reasons that are appropriate for
determining the truth of a proposition. How, then, can a subject appeal to pragmatic
reasons without being charged with wishful thinking? Pace argues that moral-pragmatic
arguments can solve this problem while avoiding intellectual dishonesty.
Pace is worried that James’ argument by itself is not sufficient to eliminate intellectual
dishonesty and provides two arguments to support this. According to Pace, James often
favors belief in J-cases when the subject’s evidence fails to support one option over another
[18, p. 13]. The problem is how a subject can simultaneously believe that the evidence
favors neither option while convincing oneself that one option is more favored. Pace be-
lieves this is being intellectually dishonest. In these cases withholding belief seems to be
accurately assessing one’s evidence and to do otherwise seems epistemically inappropriate.
The second argument Pace raises against J-cases involves situations when a subject
has evidence that favors one option but does not favor that option significantly enough to
provide full on justification for belief. Pace argues that James cannot account for the lack of
justification in these case when the pragmatic conditions are favorable enough. Put another
way, it is unclear how significantly pragmatic factors can influence epistemic justification.
It seems that so long as the evidence points toward one option more than another, James
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will argue that pragmatic factors can justify belief. But this seems problematic — can
strong pragmatic reasons paired with evidence that favor an option with 55% likelihood
really be epistemically justified? Pace thinks not and that there must be a stronger case
made for a connection between evidence and pragmatic factors than the one espoused by
James.
These problems, as Pace sees them, stem from claiming that pragmatic factors affect
evidential factors rather than influencing sufficiency criteria for evidential factors. Ac-
cording to Pace (and in agreement with Grimm), moral-pragmatic factors are appropriate
if they influence threshold rather than realizer components of knowledge. Arguing for
pragmatic factors that influence the realizer components of knowledge is difficult because
pragmatic and evidential factors will be competing with each other and it is not clear how
they compete without leading to cases of intellectual dishonesty. Arguing for pragmatic
factors that influence the threshold component of knowledge is an easier claim to defend,
however. Evidence in this case remains as important as it always has been, and pragmatic
factors do not compete but rather play a role in judging when evidence is sufficient for
belief. In this way Pace argues that pragmatic factors influence what evidence is good
enough for justification.
According to Pace (again, also in agreement with Grimm), there seems to be no princi-
pled, purely epistemic way to set the standards of justification. The best way to meet this
challenge is to draw upon pragmatic considerations [18, p. 16]. Pace concludes by provid-
ing an account of moral encroachment on epistemic justification where the moral-pragmatic
component provides justification for the threshold of evidence needed for a belief to count
as knowledge. In this way, moral-pragmatic encroachment supplements evidentialism and
does not conflict with it. Pace’s account is given below [18, p. 21]:
One has sufficient evidence for justified belief that p in context C if p is more
likely than not on one’s total evidence and adopting the Counsel of Courage is
morally preferable to adopting the Counsel of Caution for S in C.
One has sufficient evidence for justified belief that p in context C only if p is
more likely than not on one’s total evidence and it is not the case that the
Counsel of Caution is morally preferable to the Counsel of Courage in C.
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Moral considerations therefore help us balance the appropriate Counsel of Caution and
Courage when there is no purely-epistemic reason to suppose which level of evidence is
required for justification. Pace offers little in terms of describing what is morally preferable.
In Chapter 3, we will offer an alternative account of moral encroachment that addresses
a solution to this question. At this point, Pace’s account serves as a conclusion of our
discussion of the pragmatic and moral encroachment literature.
In summary, the encroachment literature (with the exception of James) has settled
on the less ambitious claim that pragmatic factors influence the threshold of justifica-
tion needed for knowledge. This move from realizer anti-intellectualism to threshold anti-
intellectualism has opened up conceptual space for pragmatic factors to influence a subject’s
epistemic position while remaining intellectually honest. The account of practicalism that
we will argue for is unique in that pragmatic factors are claimed to be necessary to realize
knowledge of a certain set of propositions. Following James, we will argue that pragmatic
factors reflected in actions taken on behalf of one’s passional nature are required to come




The evolution of pragmatic encroachment as seen through the last chapter points towards
the increasing need (even amongst practicalists themselves) to come to terms with when
and how pragmatic factors interact with the traditional conditions of knowledge. What
began as a claim that pragmatic factors place an additional condition on knowledge has
been scaled back to the more modest proposal that pragmatic factors influence the ac-
ceptable level of the traditional factors needed for a belief to count as knowledge. We will
get back to the details practicalists need to work out to address these questions and the
appropriateness of their current responses in Chapter 3. For now, we will focus on two
broader objections against the move to pragmatic encroachment. These two objections
can be distinguished by looking at how they interpret the change in the husband’s claims
between Low and High. One objection takes the change in the husband’s claims to be insuf-
ficient to justify the addition of a pragmatic condition on knowledge. Since the husband’s
epistemic position is the same in Low and High it is either sufficient to count as knowledge
in both cases or in both cases it is insufficient to count as knowledge. In this case the
change in the husband’s claims due to a change in practical stakes is inappropriate and
one of the husband’s claims will fail to meet the truth conditions for knowledge. Similarly,
one may claim that though the husband’s behavior is telling about how we use and/or
make knowledge claims, it fails to justify the need (as pragmatic encroachment claims) for
a pragmatic condition on knowledge. Both Fumerton and Kvanvig take this approach and
their arguments will be discussed in Section 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. The other objection
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we will cover grants the appropriateness of the husband’s claims in both Low and High,
but offers an alternative explanation that does not require appealing to pragmatic factors.
This alternative explanation — what is labeled contextualism — will be discussed in the
following Section 2.1.
2.1 Contextualism and DeRose
Proponents of pragmatic encroachment argue that the differences in the husband’s claims
between Low and High point toward a required pragmatic condition on knowledge. There
is an alternative option, however, that can still account for the propriety of the husband’s
claims in Low and High without invoking additional pragmatic factors on knowledge.
Contextualism claims that what is meant by ‘know’ varies depending on the ascriber’s
context. Returning again to the Bank Case, though the husband is in the same epistemic
position with respect to knowing that the bank will be open on Saturday in Low and High,
the contextualist will claim that ‘know’ in each context expresses a different epistemic
relation. The use of the term ‘know’ expresses a certain relationship in Low that the
husband is able to meet, while ‘know’ expresses a different, stronger relation in High that
the husband can no longer meet. Contextualism therefore maintains the propriety of the
husbands claims in both Low and High and does so without appealing to a change in
pragmatic factors.
As hinted at in Chapter 1 the Bank Case was originally given by DeRose to support
contextualism. Pragmatic encroachment and contextualism are similar in that the prag-
matic factors that practicalists claim point to a pragmatic condition on knowledge are the
same factors that contextualists claim warrant a change in context and the term ‘know’.
DeRose nonetheless provides two arguments in favor of giving low/high stakes case like the
Bank Case a contextualist interpretation rather than a practicalist interpretation. One
argument purports to reduce pragmatic encroachment to absurdity. The second, which
DeRose takes to be the more significant objection to pragmatic encroachment, involves
how pragmatic encroachment handles third-person attributions in high stakes cases. We
will discuss both of these objections below.
DeRose’s first objection is relatively straightforward. Pragmatic encroachment leads
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to several counter-intuitive conclusions. For example it seems bizarre to claim that an
individual can know more simply by caring less, but this seems to be what pragmatic
encroachment suggests. If what makes a belief count as knowledge depends on pragmatic
factors, then a change in one’s pragmatic relation to a proposition may change whether
or not one knows the proposition. Pragmatic encroachment seems to give rise to many of
these types of claims [6, p. 194]:
She does know, but she wouldn’t have known if more had been at stake.
She doesn’t know, but she will know tomorrow, when less will be at stake.
She knows on the weekends when she isn’t on duty and is only wondering out
of idle curiosity; but on weekdays, when much rides on whether she’s right, she
doesn’t know.
If we hold the truth-related factors constant for the subject across these examples, it is
difficult to imagine these examples expressing truths. If they do express truths, we must
explain why we rarely hear them and why they seem unnatural. Rarely, for example, does a
speaker cite the importance of pragmatic factors in attributing knowledge and rarely do we
hear an interlocutor demand it. Imagine a third-person ascription that contains only the
first part of one of the above claims — e.g. ‘She knows that p’. When does an interlocutor
counter with a request for the second half by saying something like, “Maybe, but what is
her practical situation? Whether she knows p or not will depend on her practical stakes.”
Citing pragmatic factors in a knowledge claim and demanding them both seem unnatural.
In addition to supporting these seemingly absurd claims, pragmatic encroachment runs
into another problem while explaining cases when different subjects in different contexts
make third-party ascriptions. Let us look again at a Bank Case that has been slightly
modified. The husband is in a high stakes situation like in High, but in this case the wife
remains in a low stakes situation — the wife, for whatever reason, fails to find a relevant
increase in stakes. Furthermore, and just to be clear, the wife and husband only differ
with respect to their practical stakes, that is, they are in the same epistemic position with
regard to knowing whether or not the bank will be open on Saturday. As in High the
husband will claim to not be in a position to know. When asked to comment on whether
the wife knows that the bank will be open, the husband will claim that she too does not
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know that the bank will be open. She, after all, is in the same epistemic position that he
is and since he is not in a position to know she must not be in a position to know. But
the wife’s situation tells a different story. She is in a low stakes situation and will claim
that her epistemic position is sufficient for knowledge. Since her husband is in the same
epistemic position, when pressed to comment on whether her husband knows that the bank
will be open, she will claim he also possesses knowledge. Though both of these situations
seem to occur quite naturally, there is a clear disagreement between these positions.
The problem, as DeRose points out, is that pragmatic encroachment cannot readily ac-
count for this disagreement. If the subject’s practical stakes set the appropriate conditions
for knowledge, there should be agreement amongst ascribers on the appropriate conditions
for knowledge. Though it is often the case that the ascriber applies the same standards
to others, there seems to be no agreement — as practicalists would have it — amongst
different ascribers. We can contrast this position with the claim made by contextualism.
Contextualism claims that variation in what is meant by ‘know’ is attached to the context
of the speaker of the attribution. According to contextualism other speakers in different
contexts can always apply different standards to ‘know’ and can apply different ascriptions
to the same subject. As DeRose writes, “[According to contextualism] In neither of the
Bank Cases does [the husband] either simply know or simply not know. . . . [Pragmatic
encroachment] holds that the subject’s practical situation sets the standard for whether
any speaker in any context can truthfully say that the subject ‘knows’, while contextu-
alism says that the standard set by the subject’s context is not necessarily binding on
other speakers in other contexts . . . ” [6, p.229]. What actually happens seems to support
the contextualist’s prediction that subjects apply the same standards for knowledge de-
termined by their own context to others. This, as DeRose argues, is another difficulty for
pragmatic encroachment (and, of course, is another reason in favor of contextualism).1
The next two sections will look at objections — the first from Richard Fumerton and
1This again leads back to DeRose’s first objection. What if the husband and wife are asked to take
into consideration the other’s practical situation, would that change anything? — It doesn’t seem like it.
Different subjects in different contexts ascribe/deny knowledge to a third-party even if the different subjects
have the same knowledge of the third-party’s practical situation. As in the first objection, neither tends
to take into account the other’s practical stakes and ascribe knowledge based on the subject’s pragmatic
situation.
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the second from Johnathan Kvanvig — against the claim that low/high stakes cases like
the Bank Case point towards a pragmatic condition on knowledge.
2.2 Fumerton
The previous argument against pragmatic encroachment focused on a possible alternative
account for the propriety of the husband’s claims in both Low and High. The next sections
focus on how conclusions drawn from the low/high stakes cases like the Bank Case fail
to support a pragmatic condition on knowledge. Fumerton, in particular, argues against
pragmatic factors encroaching on epistemic probability and the underlying epistemic jus-
tification upon which it relies. Thus there are some epistemic concepts that must remain
free of pragmatic encroachment. He continues by demonstrating that even if we can show
that pragmatic factors encroach on some other epistemic concepts, including them as an
additional condition on knowledge would make our use of ‘know’ unnecessarily complicated.
When an agent faces a decision on how how to act, he or she looks at the consequences
of the possible actions open to them. Since it is often difficult to determine the actual
consequences of an action, an agent often relies on the probability — from their point
of view — of the various possible outcomes. We will call the unadulterated version of
these probabilities (i.e the probabilities that are a function of our evidence only and that
represent the likelihood of certain outcomes) our epistemic probabilities. If the decision
is a moral or prudential one, the subject uses additional value preferences to weigh these
epistemic probabilities and to ultimately make a decision.
Pragmatic considerations on how to to act are not treated any differently. Fumerton
agrees that pragmatic factors can play a role in how we weigh our preferences, but he
does not see how pragmatic reasons can enter into the initial calculation of epistemic
probability. If they did, he argues, practicalists would have to defend against the charge
of regress: to reach a conclusion on what is epistemically likely would require answering
pragmatic questions, but to answer pragmatic questions would require looking back at
epistemic probabilities, and so on. There is no clear solution to the problem and so, at
least when it comes to epistemic probabilities, we have an epistemic concept that must
remain free of pragmatic influence.
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But suppose, Fumerton continues, that a solution can be given that reconciles prag-
matic factors with epistemic probability by allowing pragmatic factors to encroach upon a
different epistemic concept. Would we then have reason to introduce pragmatic conditions
on knowledge? Fumerton argues that this would still be unnecessary. In this case there is
no good reason for a subject to take into account their pragmatic relationship to a propo-
sition when claiming to know. Here is an example given by Fumerton against Fantl and
McGrath’s view. According to Fantl and McGrath what a subject knows is determined
by how he or she is willing to act, which sets the appropriate level of justification needed
to know. If this is the case, claiming to ‘know’ would have to reflect both the agent’s cal-
culated epistemic probabilities as well as the agent’s (subjective) calculation of their own
willingness to act. As Fumerton points out, this is overly complicated and unnecessary
since we are only interested in the appropriate (more objective) epistemic probabilities.
The more efficient and straightforward way seems to involve the speaker stating only the
epistemic probabilities from the beginning and then letting the interlocutor perform their
own expected utility calculations.
Fumerton concludes with a final petition against pragmatic encroachment. There are
many things (pragmatic, prudential, moral, etc.) that influence our use of ‘know’. In
certain situations there may be legitimate reasons to feign knowledge in order to influence
an interlocutor or onlooker. Fumerton provides an example of his wife saying, “I’ll just be
a minute.” Though she is likely to still be fifteen minutes from being ready, we recognize
that the meaning of her statement is not a genuine claim to her knowing that she will be a
minute. In this case we do not assume, unlike what is often required by contextualists or
pragmatic encroachers, that ‘minute’ has changed its meaning, or that the truth conditions
for ‘I’ll be a minute’ have changed, perhaps by pointing towards a pragmatic condition on
knowledge. Rather, we acknowledge that the intended use of the statement is different
from the literal meaning. Ultimately it is difficult, when we acknowledge that this is the
case and that additional pragmatic conditions on knowledge are unnecessarily complicated,
to suppose that low/high stakes cases support practicalism.
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2.3 Kvanvig
Kvanvig writes, “What difference does it make if practical stakes are included in the na-
ture of knowledge itself rather than simply being linked to knowledge in some way? The
latter has always been obvious, but the former view goes beyond this claim to something
stronger” [15, p. 79]. Kvanvig argues that the factors typically thought to justify pragmatic
encroachment really need only reflect the latter and not the former.
Kvanvig begins by clarifying the distinction between practicalist views and intellectu-
alist views that support a link between knowledge and practice. He points out that the
intellectualist has many options available to explain this connection without claiming that
practical stakes are epistemically relevant to the nature of knowledge. An intellectualist
may claim that knowledge can be relied on in practical affairs, but that such a connec-
tion is defeasible. For example, an intellectualist may argue that the connection between
knowledge and practice is appropriate because insofar as knowledge involves justification
suitable for closure of further inquiry it provides the closure needed to decide and act [15,
p. 78-79]. Such an account provides a sufficient connection between knowledge and prac-
tice, but leaves open the possibility that the connection to practice may not be part of
the nature of knowledge itself: it leaves open the possibility, that is, that knowledge may
still serve another function not tied to action. In order for the practicalist to overcome
this intellectualist maneuver, they must show that this connection is either not defeasible,
or that its defeasibility arises through no fault of one’s epistemic position (i.e. that an
additional pragmatic factor can work over and above one’s epistemic position).
Kvanvig has serious doubts that either of these options can work. He begins by pointing
out cases when knowledge and practice come apart. There are times when a subject fails
to act in accordance with their knowledge because additional factors make him or her
resistant to do so. Increased stakes, for example, may make a subject hesitant to act on
knowledge or to retract a claim to knowledge.2 Another subject may have knowledge but
feel that further justification is needed before they can act on that belief. As this last
scenario suggests, skeptical possibilities may lead one to fail to act on what one knows.
The threat of global skepticism puts this point into relief. Supposing a world where global
2Again, some may describe the husband’s claim in High to be one such example.
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skepticism is true, practical deliberation must either function as it always has, in which
case practical deliberation must be independent to some extent of knowledge, or, skeptical
possibilities will lead to paralysis and inaction. Either of these scenarios prove problematic
for the practicalist that wants a strong link between knowledge and action.
There are other cases where action is not clearly tied to knowledge. An action can and
sometimes must be based on insufficient evidence. In these cases we have to act on whatever
beliefs we have even if these beliefs do no count as knowledge. We can go even further and
point to cases when practical concerns are irrelevant and/or restricted. Consider knowing
q : that whatever you do, the best thing is to act as if you don’t know p. Assuming such
knowledge is possible, you can possess this knowledge while acting/knowing all the while
that one cannot use this knowledge in practical inference. These cases all point against a
necessary link between action and practice and it is left up to the practicalist to account
for such discrepancies. As “it is hard”, Kvanvig writes, “to see how one can claim to
be a justificationist about knowledge while admitting that knowledge sometimes occurs
without justification. Equally so, it is hard to see how to be a pragmatic encroacher about
knowledge while admitting that sometimes the preferred connection between knowledge
and practice is absent” [15, p. 84].
Some of the problems above can be circumvented by a different approach to pragmatic
encroachment. We could say, as Kvanvig points out, that a failure to act in these cases is
not due to a failure in one’s traditional epistemic position with respect to the belief, but
is due to some property of the belief itself or the act of putting the belief into practice. It
may, for example, be a belief that is morally wrong, or a belief that will be used in practical
reasoning. Kvanvig claims that the problem with these characterizations is that they are
too weak to justify the conclusion drawn by practicalists that pragmatic factors play a role
in the conditions for knowledge. They are ad hoc in that nothing justifies (or at least,
according to Kvanvig, no argument has yet been given) why these particular properties
are chosen over any other. It seems that in a similar move we can claim political or
aesthetic encroachment. We may claim, for example, that if you know p but p isn’t part of
some beautiful theory, the reason you cannot use knowledge of p in certain instances is not
because of some epistemic weakness you have with respect to p, but is because p is not part
of some beautiful theory. Though we can easily place such conditions on knowledge there
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is nothing about aesthetic conditions (or political, or pragmatic, or something else of this
sort) that requires that they be placed into the nature of knowledge. Kvanvig concludes
that practicalists wrongfully attribute a connection between knowledge and practice as a
condition on knowledge.
Kvanvig takes these conclusions and offers an alternative explanation of the low/high
stakes cases like the Bank Case. Kvanvig acknowledges that a theory of knowledge may
have to account for both the nature and value of knowledge. What practicalists claim
is that the practical value of knowledge should play a role in the nature of knowledge.
But Kvanvig equates this move with a value judgment on the side of the practicalist.
For practicalism to argue for pragmatic encroachment on knowledge it must argue for a
specific value claim on knowledge. Though it certainly is the case that someone can value
the practical use of knowledge it is far from clear (and according to Kvanvig, has yet to be
argued) that it is the value of knowledge. Knowledge can certainly be valuable because of
its connection to practice (i.e. its use in practical reasoning), but it may be valuable for
other reasons as well. Kvanvig therefore equates a rejection of practicalism as a rejection
of a certain value claim on knowledge. A good strategy for arguing against practicalism




An Alternative Argument for
Practicalism
Practicalism claims that a practical factor can influence a subject’s position to know. What
specifically about a subject’s practical position makes their position to know change? This
chapter will focus on clearing up some of these details. In particular, we will focus on how
practicalism handles the charge of intellectual dishonesty. We acknowledge that caring
about knowing that p does not improve a subject’s position to know p, and yet some of
the previous arguments for practicalism seem to focus on these very stakes. Some of these
factors include the practical cost of being wrong, how important it is to the subject that p
be true, whether one has a practical reason to make sure that p.
We will offer an alternative argument for practicalism that tries to avoid this tension by
remaining epistemically appropriate. It does so by offering a theoretical account that does
not appeal to the subject’s practical position relative to p, but rather appeals to the sub-
ject’s epistemic stakes relative to p. We will use the Bank Case as a starting point for our
discussion but will ultimately go beyond it. Unlike the Bank Case that is open to a host
of practical/pragmatic factors, we will argue that these factors should be appropriately
limited to the particular pragmatic factors related to increased epistemic stakes. Increased
epistemic stakes have the same characteristics as J-cases and we can apply James’ argument
for pragmatically justified belief. In particular, we will provide an argument for practical-
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ism that appeals to James’ dependent propositions. This will prove significant for three
reasons. First, it offers a different and novel account of pragmatic encroachment. Dur-
ing J-cases pragmatic factors can appropriately influence our passional nature and, given
the existence of dependent propositions, our position to know. Second, rather than an
argument for threshold anti-intellectualism, this is an argument for a necessary pragmatic
requirement to realize knowledge and is thus an argument for realizer anti-intellectualism.
Pragmatic action on behalf of the subject is necessary to acquire knowledge of dependent
propositions. Finally, it offers a new framework to address the connection between prag-
matic encroachment (and epistemology in general) and the moral domain. I argue that the
existence of dependent propositions can justify moral claims since the process by which
we come to know dependent propositions can be seen as a moral process. More of these
details will be provided in Section 3.5.
3.1 Is it skepticism or practical stakes?
In the high stakes Bank Case it is unclear what brings about a change in the husband’s
position to know. What is clear is that not just any change will do and that only certain
relevant changes in the husband’s environment or practical situation may influence his
response. We will look at what we mean by relevant below.
As Fantl and McGrath have pointed out there are (at least) two factors that may affect
the standards/conditions of knowledge: the raising of error possibilities, and the variation
of practical stakes [9]. The Bank Case involves both of these factors. The raising of error
possibilities includes the references to the possibility that the bank will be closed, while the
increased practical stakes arises from the references to the importance of the check being
deposited. These factors have a complex relationship that makes it difficult to determine
which factor is relevant in leading to a change in the husband’s position to know. When
more practical factors are at stake, for example, a subject will often focus on possible
sources of error. Despite the high correlation between both factors we can imagine cases
where the practical environment is held fixed while the salience of skeptical possibilities
are varied and vice versa. We will look at these variations of the Bank Case to narrow
down the factor that does the work in changing the husband’s position to know. We will
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argue that epistemic stakes must play a primary role in low/high stakes cases.
The Bank Case is set up to place less emphasis on skeptical possibilities. In both Low
and High the wife raises a skeptical possibility. Though they are different possibilities, they
are similar enough that for all practical purposes we can consider the skeptical environment
to be constant between Low and High. Since the practical stakes is the only thing that
changes between Low and High, the thought is that practical stakes must be the relevant
difference that yields the husband to change his response. From this it is tempting to make
the bolder claim that practical stakes by themselves can lead to a change in the husband’s
position to know. In a similar vein, most skeptical arguments are addressed as simply being
irrelevant. There are many instances when skeptical scenarios are raised that have little
influence on the husband’s response. We can imagine the commonly accepted response of,
“Yes, but that is crazy.” Though this is usually enough to sidestep skeptical possibilities
and for the subject to retain their claim to knowledge, such a response does little to solve
or address the skeptical problems and the question of whether or not the subject actually
has knowledge.
There is a necessary and important link, however, between practical stakes and skeptical
possibilities in low/high stakes examples. The problem with dismissing skeptical claims is
that practical stakes influence the husband’s response only when they are paired with the
salience of skeptical scenarios. This becomes obvious when we look at an example that has
varying practical stakes and where no skeptical possibilities are addressed. Imagine the
following dialogue in a bank case-like scenario:
(Modified Stakes I ). My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon,
as in [Low Stakes ], and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit
our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on
Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until
noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and important check.
If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday
morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad
situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds
me of these facts. She then says, “But it is so important that we deposit this
check. Again, do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as
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confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, I reply, “I just told
you that I know the bank will be open tomorrow. Just because it is important
to us does not change that.”
This situation highlights the fact that raising practical stakes can be dismissed just as easily
as raising some bizarre skeptical possibilities. The naturalness of the husband’s reply is a
strong indication that practical stakes by themselves do not influence a subject’s position
to know. For the husband to appropriately change his response — and more importantly
for an appropriate corresponding change in the husband’s position to know — skeptical
possibilities must also be salient.
We have argued previously for the importance of skeptical possibilities in influencing
the husband’s position to know. Recall that Grimm makes a similar point about pragmatic
encroachment (see Section 1.4). Grimm claims that pragmatic encroachment can only arise
if it is paired with an insufficiency in some traditional truth-related factor. The husband
must be in a position less than certainty in order to find skeptical possibilities relevant. If
the husband is certain (or thinks he is certain) he will not take the skeptical possibilities
seriously and will not question his position to know.
A connection between skeptical possibilities and a subject’s practical stakes is required
for pragmatic encroachment to arise. The husband must find the skeptical possibility
relevant and give it serious consideration (which is where practical stakes may come in)
for it to lead to a change in the his response and to potentially lead to a change in his
position to know. This is often implied in the addition of practical stakes but it is left out
if one concludes that a change in practical position alone does the work in changing the
husband’s response. Rather than refer to an increase in practical stakes to denote (and
possibly confuse) this position, we will refer to an increase in epistemic stakes to make
this point clear. Focusing on epistemic stakes provides a clearer connection to a change
in a subject’s position to know, and we will focus on providing an account of pragmatic
encroachment that goes through epistemic stakes. For pragmatic encroachment to be
intellectually appropriate it must work through increased epistemic stakes.
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3.2 Epistemic Stakes and J-Cases
It can be difficult to differentiate epistemic stakes from practical stakes. As stated before,
an increase in practical stakes will often be paired with questioning one’s epistemic position
and with increased epistemic stakes. Though there may be a high correlation between epis-
temic stakes and one’s practical stakes, epistemic stakes can be more clearly differentiated
when compared with one’s practical position. A subject can feel an increase in epistemic
stakes without a change in practical position. In this section we will give an example that
demonstrates this point and helps distinguish epistemic stakes from a subject’s practical
position.
To see what is meant by epistemic stakes imagine the following scenario. A subject faces
an option between accepting or rejecting a hypothesis. Evidence is inconclusive and the
subject recognizes that both choices are a possibility and that the decision is an important
one. In such a situation the subject feels the weight of balancing the twin truth goals —
of accepting a hypothesis in the hope of acquiring a truth or of rejecting the hypothesis in
the hope of avoiding error. In feeling the need to balance the twin truth goals the scientist
feels increased epistemic stakes.
As the above description already hints towards, increased epistemic stakes are akin to
epistemic J-cases. A subject facing increased epistemic stakes is facing a genuine option
that is intellectually open. As Pace points out [18, See also Sections 1.3 and 1.5], the
immediate benefit of focusing on J-cases is that they offer a situation where pragmatic
factors can encroach upon knowledge in a way that is intellectually appropriate. Insofar
as the evidence is not coercive a subject may appeal to pragmatic factors to justify the
weighing of the twin truth goals without being intellectually dishonest. The pragmatic
factors will not go against the subject’s evidence because evidence by itself cannot justify
which truth goal should be chosen.
Perhaps the clearest differentiation of epistemic stakes from practical stakes come from
looking at epistemic relative to two subjects. Different subjects in similar practical and
epistemic positions with respect to p may nonetheless have different epistemic stakes to-
wards p. Even with similar practical and epistemic positions towards p, one subject may
feel the weight of balancing the twin truth goals with respect to p while the other sub-
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ject does not. As James describes, whether an option is alive or dead is not an intrinsic
property of the hypothesis itself but is rather a relation to the individual thinker [13, p.
1]. James goes on to say that in some cases whether an option is living or dead is itself
a passional decision [13, p. 4]. The difference in epistemic stakes is dependent on the
subject’s passional nature. Consequences of the work itself, fame, happiness, etc., may all
play roles in whether a subject feels the weight of the truth goals and how the subject
balances them, but this weight does not come from the practical/epistemic position itself.
An additional component on behalf of the subject’s passional nature is required to produce
a change in epistemic stakes. It is up to the individual to feel the weight of balancing the
two truth goals.
3.3 A comment on the subject’s and the ascriber’s
perspective
A common discussion in the Bank Case literature is whether the legitimacy of the husband’s
claims is determined by the husband or an onlooker ascribing a state of knowledge to the
husband. Both seem legitimate options and both can produce different results. In the
Bank Case the husband clearly questions his own knowledge. The skeptical possibility
(and the stakes associated with it) is a very real possibility to him. This is not so obvious
from the perspective of an onlooker (i.e. the person attributing knowledge). To see why
this matters let us look at the Bank Case example from the perspective of the wife. Recall
that in Modified I given above, the addition of practical stakes (and only practical stakes)
mentioned by the wife did little to influence the husband’s decision. A similar case may
arise when the roles are reversed and the wife remains unconvinced by the change in
practical (and only practical) stakes on the part of the husband. Imagine this modified
case below:
(Modified Stakes II ). My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon,
as in [Low Stakes ], and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit
our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on
Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until
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noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and important check.
If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday
morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad
situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds
me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know
the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as confident as I was before that
the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I’d better go in and make
sure.” My wife, questioning the change I made to my claim to knowledge, then
says, “So you didn’t know before [when you said in Low Stakes ] that the bank
will be open tomorrow.”
The wife may back up such a claim by appealing (as is the case in the original Modified I )
to the artificial change due to practical stakes. Since wanting or believing something to be
true does not make it true, the addition of only practical stakes does little to change the
husband’s position to know. Since the husband has not acquired new evidence from the
wife’s perspective, she can express disbelief over the husband’s claims and his apparently
artificial epistemic shift. After acknowledging both scenarios the wife may think that the
husband either spoke falsely in the high stakes case and that he still really possesses knowl-
edge or that he spoke falsely in the low stakes case when he claimed to know when he really
did not. A similar situation may occur if the wife is in a position of increased epistemic
stakes and the husband is not. In this case she may describe the situation according to
her own high standards while the husband’s description reflects his low epistemic stakes.
Though again contrary to the husband’s perspective, the wife’s interpretation of the events
in these cases also seems legitimate.
Pragmatic encroachment only arises from the perspective of the subject with increased
epistemic stakes. As demonstrated by the wife in Modified II above, it is easy (at least
in some cases) to dismiss the behavior demonstrated by the husband in the Bank Case.
What one subject finds to be a genuine (and intellectually open) option may not be found
to be a genuine option by another. It is the first subject that experiences the problem as a
real one and it is the first subject’s position (if any do so) where pragmatic encroachment
may arise and be justified. We will therefore look at the problem from the perspective
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of the individual who recognizes the increased epistemic stakes.1 The reason to do so is
twofold. For starters, we certainly find ourselves in situations similar to that of the husband,
and though we may dismiss other’s husband-type behavior, when we find ourselves facing
a genuine option the decision is not so easily brushed aside. Since these options are
intellectually open they are difficult to resolve, and in these times additional evidence or
arguments provided by others often offers little help. It is important to be able to address
how a subject can resolve this problem from their own point of view. Secondly, it is at this
point (again, if any) where pragmatic encroachment will be intellectually appropriate. This
will become more clear when our argument is established, but there are several ways for
pragmatic factors to influence a subject that are only available to a subject in a position
of increased epistemic stakes. For example, it may be the case that pragmatic factors
influence knowledge precisely at those times when the subject faces a difficult decision like
a genuine option, or when a subject is working to improve his or her level of understanding.
To dismiss these possibilities may be blocking the very options that give rise to and are
needed to justify pragmatic encroachment.2
3.4 James’ Dependent Propositions and Pragmatic
Belief
The past two sections have argued that in order for pragmatic encroachment to be in-
tellectually honest, it must occur during instances of increased epistemic stakes. Talk of
1We should note here that such a move enables us to bypass a host of popular solutions to the problem.
Many of these approaches attempt to explain the inadequacy of the husband’s statements by judging the
husband’s statements in either Low or High to be inappropriate or false (i.e. they take the wife’s position
in the above example). This does not address what I take to be an important issue, which I will now
address.
2In the next section we will offer a reason why a pragmatic condition on knowledge may have taken so
long to be distinguished from the traditional components of knowledge. In line with the above comments,
we offer a reason for the tendency to fail to take into account these factors that are only available to a
subject in a position of increased epistemic stakes. In short, we offer an account of why a subject that is not
in a position of increased epistemic stakes with respect to p may readily dismiss pragmatic encroachment
upon knowing p.
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such epistemic encroachment may be too obvious and insofar as epistemic stakes can be
addressed by the traditional conditions on knowledge the situation as we have described it
may no longer pose a problem. We will now address this issue by providing an argument
for practicalism that takes increased epistemic stakes as its starting point. Insofar as there
are dependent propositions, knowledge of these dependent propositions must depend on a
prior pragmatically influenced belief.
Let us begin by reconstructing the Bank Case in light of the discussion in this chapter.
The husband is in a position of increased epistemic stakes. The husband faces an intellec-
tually open option and insofar as he takes the option seriously he finds the option to be a
genuine option. The husband is in an epistemic J-case. The husband must choose between
the twin truth goals given by the Counsel of Courage and the Counsel of Caution. It is
here that pragmatic encroachment may arise and it is the next step that needs appropriate
pragmatic justification.
This description is very much in line with the analysis given by Pace [18]. Pace argues
that to be intellectually appropriate pragmatic factors must play a role in cases such as
these when evidence is inconclusive. Pace goes on to claim that James is vague about what
determines the appropriate truth goal in a situation, and that depending on how this is
done, it may or may not be intellectually appropriate. Favoring belief (i.e. J-belief) in
J-cases when the subject’s evidence fails to support a belief in one option over another is
still intellectually inappropriate.
It is at this step that our argument differs. Pace claims that in some cases James sup-
ports the inappropriate view mentioned above. Pace, however, overlooks the existence of
dependent propositions and the role they play in James’ argument. Recall that dependent
propositions require a prior action on behalf of one’s passional nature before evidence is
found to support the truth of the proposition. It seems that a natural Jamesian reply to
Pace’s criticism is that it is appropriate to believe p when the subject’s evidence favors
p’s being a dependent proposition. This additional restriction on J-beliefs will make them
intellectually appropriate.
We will describe the details of this view, and then we will argue for its moral significance,
which may not be clear from the start. First, some of the details.
Pragmatic Belief: a subject is justified to believe p insofar as the subject’s evidence
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favors p being a dependent proposition.
Though this description relies on evidence and in this way is truth-related, dependent
propositions are by definition importantly independent of evidential considerations. Even
though a subject may have evidence of the existence of dependent propositions (as James’
analogies demonstrate), their defining characteristic is that evidence is found to be coercive
only after an action is taken on behalf of the subject’s passional nature. This means that
before such a willful advance the option will be intellectually open since the evidence will
be found to be inconclusive. Only after this point may the subject find coercive evidence
in support of p.
Pragmatic beliefs as we have defined them also account for the importance of increased
epistemic stakes. Since dependent propositions will remain intellectually open until a
willful advance is made, a subject may experience increased epistemic stakes when facing
a decision to believe a dependent proposition. Low/high stakes cases like the Bank Case
where pragmatic beliefs influence a subject’s position to know arise when the subject
experiences these increased epistemic stakes. The situation is different for the subject that
does not experience increased epistemic stakes. Though this subject faces an opportunity
to improve their position to know, they may not exercise this option, and their position to
know may not be improved. In this way discussion of the importance of J-cases in low/high
stakes cases is still accounted for.
Let us now look at how pragmatic belief supports practicalism. Recall that practicalism
states:
Practicalism: Two subjects S and S’, equally alike with respect to their epistemic posi-
tion but who differ with respect to their practical position, may differ with respect
to their position to know that p.
We will provide the clearest instance of practicalism first, and then we will try to argue
for its broader applicability. Imagine first that p is a dependent proposition. Both S
and S’ are in the same epistemic position, but whereas S does not believe in dependent
propositions (imagine a subject akin to the curmudgeon from James’ Friend Example in
Chapter 1) S’ does. To be more specific we may argue that there is a willful advance on
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behalf of the subject S’ towards p. It is certainly the case that S’ is in a better position
to know p than S. Thus, practicalism is true. Belief in a dependent proposition will put
one in a better position to know that dependent proposition.
A criticism is readily available: What if dependent truths do not exist? Apart from
the two analogies provided in support of their existence, James offers little supporting
details. One option along these lines would be to argue against intellectual openness,
which would mean that dependent propositions have (though it may be difficult to find)
coercive evidence in favor of their support. If this is the case, one may argue that belief
is still only appropriate if there is coercive evidence in support of the belief. There are
at least two paths to respond to this criticism. In these cases a subject may still need to
supply a willful advance. Insofar as this willful advance is pragmatically influenced our
argument will still support practicalism. Another response to this criticism may appeal
to the usefulness of pragmatic beliefs. It is certainly useful in personal relationships and
scientific practice to believe in dependent propositions, and insofar as they are useful it
seems we may appeal to pragmatic reasons to justify the belief in their existence. Look
again at the Friend Example. It need not be the case that the curmudgeon is actually
trapped in an evidential vacuum where evidence will never be found to be conclusively
in favor of his friend’s good or bad intentions. What only needs to be the case is that
believing in p will help improve the curmudgeon’s position to know p. Insofar as it does
so, such a belief argues in favor of practicalism in that it puts the curmudgeon — without
a change in his epistemic position — in a better position to know.
Finally, there is an interesting result that follows from our description of dependent
propositions. Once a willful advance is made, evidence may be found to be coercive and
what was a dependent proposition has in an important sense ceased to be a dependent
proposition. The dependent proposition has become a regular proposition in that it now
has traditional, coercive evidential support. In this way one may second guess evidence
of dependent propositions and come to disbelieve them. It may be easier to find evidence
in support of dependent propositions in general after one has gone through the process,
but again, since one’s current epistemic position no longer favors and provides evidence
for their support, it need not be so. This may explain why pragmatic beliefs have such
a difficult time being justified. For one group of subjects the evidence and arguments in
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support of dependent propositions is unconvincing (for them the existence of dependent
propositions is intellectually open). For the other group the question is no longer living.
It is either already known, or it is unknown to the point where the subject does not find
it to be a candidate for belief. This is another reason to stress the importance of genuine
options, increased epistemic stakes, and of the fundamental role of the willful advance in
cases like the Bank Case. In many low/high stakes examples these factors are neglected or
taken for granted at the start.
3.5 The Moral Significance of Dependent Propositions
We have provided an argument for pragmatic encroachment that appeals to dependent
propositions. In this section we will argue that this encroachment should be interpreted
as moral encroachment.
Recall Pace’s argument for moral encroachment (see Section 1.5). Pace focuses on
defending an epistemically appropriate place for moral beliefs in epistemic justification. A
subject certainly may choose to use one’s moral claims in weighing the truth goals, but
Pace’s proposal leaves open several questions: What makes a belief particularly moral?
Why are these moral beliefs significant in weighing the twin epistemic truth goals? We
want to argue that there is an alternative argument for moral encroachment that more
readily addresses these questions.
In attempting to provide solutions to these questions James’ discussion at the end of
‘The Will to Believe’ will prove useful. Recall that James recognizes the connection be-
tween the religious hypothesis and dependent propositions. Since the religious hypothesis
shares characteristics of dependent propositions, he argues that one may be pragmatically
justified to believe it. After all, he argues, the religious hypothesis may actually be a de-
pendent proposition. Notice here, however, that we risk running into the same problems
addressed in the preceding paragraph. Why is it a religious/moral proposition? Is it be-
cause the content itself is particularly moral/religious in nature? Pace and James (though
perhaps James to a lesser extent) must answer to these questions. There is another ap-
proach, however, that readily addresses these questions and takes the connection between
dependent propositions and the religious hypothesis as a starting point.
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Here is what we have in mind. Looking back at the Friend Example, a J-belief is
required on behalf of the curmudgeon before the curmudgeon can make a new friend. Now
it may be said of this step that the a J-belief is required before the curmudgeon can be
friendly to his new friend. But can’t we also say that J-belief itself is a friendly action? We
think that the latter is also true. Let us now apply this to the James’ example of the moral
skeptic. Recall that a moral skeptic for James needs to provide a J-belief before they can
be confirmed in their belief. As in the case with the curmudgeon, one may say that the
J-belief is required before the moral skeptic can find evidence for and ultimately practice
his or her moral beliefs. But again, as in the case with the curmudgeon, the J-belief itself
can and should be seen as a step in the moral direction and thus as a moral action. In
the same way we can say that providing a pragmatic belief is (though phrased slightly
confusingly) an epistemic action.
This seems reasonable, and we can apply the same idea to James’ argument for belief
in the religious hypothesis. James’ argument for believing in the religious hypothesis is
that it may come to be a dependent proposition. We agree with James that if the religious
hypothesis is true, it is likely to be a dependent proposition. If the religious hypothesis is a
dependent proposition, then it seems providing the belief needed to know that dependent
proposition (and more specifically, the belief James argues for) can be considered a religious
action. Could it be that our argument for pragmatic belief is an argument for religious
belief? Or, more generally and to the point, could it be that providing a pragmatic belief
is at the same time a moral action? The process of believing in and coming to know a
dependent proposition may be seen as being moral in nature.
Our argument for pragmatic encroachment therefore offers an alternative to defend
moral encroachment on a subject’s position to know. The benefit of such an account
is that we need not appeal to ‘moral’ propositions but need only appeal to dependent
propositions in general. If this is the case, our account of pragmatic encroachment can be
interpreted just as a type of moral encroachment — what characterizes providing pragmatic
beliefs from providing beliefs in general is that they are particularly moral beliefs.
Viewing pragmatic beliefs as moral beliefs and vice versa agrees with some interesting
albeit surprisingly reasonable conceptions of moral claims. Assuming that the account of
pragmatic encroachment that has been given is accurate, what is required of an individual
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that is seeking knowledge? For starters, it requires that there will be instances (notably,
when the proposition sought is a dependent proposition) when a willful advance will need to
be provided on behalf of the individual. This pragmatic belief will not be fully evidentially
supported. As pointed out in the previous section, this is because dependent propositions
remain intellectually open until a willful advance allows for coercive evidence to be found.
Such a maneuver can only be made on faith. One can interpret a pragmatic belief as a
moral action because it requires an act of faith. This much is in agreement with (and is
pretty much restating) James’ defense and justification of J-beliefs. The only difference
here is that the act of believing in a dependent proposition is interpreted as a moral action
and not just as an action that is necessary before one can confirm one’s moral claims.
There are several other conclusions that follow from claiming parity between moral
actions and providing pragmatic beliefs. First, pragmatic beliefs are a result of an action
taken on behalf of a subject’s passional nature. Nothing requires that an individual hold
a pragmatic belief, just like nothing requires that an individual be moral. Similarly the
process of coming to hold a pragmatic belief is taken up by the individual themselves and
the same story can be said of morality. Second, a pragmatic belief is formed independent
of evidential considerations and requires looking outside one’s evidential position for a
solution. This is often a key step needed to recognize one’s fallibility and humility. These
traits are often thought to be both epistemically and morally preferable. These connections
show that the parity between pragmatic encroachment as we have argued for it and the
moral domain may be more similar than one may first think.
We will end with a final comment on the prevalence of pragmatic (and what we have
just described as moral) encroachment. Our argument for pragmatic encroachment ap-
peals to the existence of dependent propositions. The epistemic J-cases where dependent
propositions may arise are more prevalent than one may initially expect. Depending on
the prevalence of skeptical scenarios, one may find oneself often in J-cases. Furthermore,
research and social knowledge covered by the Friend Example and Research Example cover
a vast set of possible knowledge. If this is the case, moral encroachment may be more
common than we may at first think.
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